The goal of the paper is to investigate the extent of the influence of American antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years of European competition policy. This as part of a wider research program aiming at assessing the role of economic theory in the development of antitrust law and policy. My argument may be summarized in four propositions. First, by taking into account what I call the "competition versus property rights" dichotomy, it turns out that the economists' contribution to the historical evolution of US antitrust law has been smaller than usually believed. Second, as far as the foundation of EEC competition policy is concerned, the influence of the American antitrust tradition has, again, been less than what is commonly claimed. Third, a crucial role on the birth of EEC antitrust has been played by a law and economics argument based on the constitutional standing of competition rules, an argument put forward by the highly influential Freiburg School of Ordoliberalism. Fourth, the ordoliberal origin of EEC competition rules, when combined with the Community's integration goal, helps explain why the impact of the "competition versus property rights" dichotomy on European antitrust law has been limited and, contrary to the US, always solved more favorably to the "competition" pole than to the "property rights" one.
Introduction
The goal of the paper is to investigate the extent, if any at all, of the influence of American antitrust tradition on the foundation and early years (up to the mid-1960s) of European competition policy.
This as part of a wider research program aiming at assessing the role of economic theory in the development of antitrust law and policy, both in the US and Europe.
1 Given the ever increasing importance that competition issues play in the ordinary functioning of economic systems, it seems indeed relevant to cast new light on the origin of antitrust law. It is all-too-frequent, in fact, to register a contrast between the decisions of antitrust authorities and courts and the prescriptions more European approach to cartels. As will be argued below, this amounted to a combination of loose controls on cartels and an ex ante vetting of business agreements, both activities being performed by an administrative body; in short, an antitrust policy based on the bureaucratic control of abuses, rather than on judicial prohibitions. Finally, the associationalist vision also led to an infatuation with planning. Though a consensus never arose as to what "planning" exactly entailed, it became the new catchword for economic policy. Both direct and indirect government intervention in the economy were deemed necessary for the correct functioning and development of the US economy (see Balisciano 1998, 155-169) . This culminated in the 1931 Swope plan, 14 a program designed to coordinate production and consumption by forcing medium and big firms to join trade associations which would in turn be empowered to favor price stability and distribute information on business practices.
It is hardly surprising that even the new piece of antitrust legislation, the 1936 RobinsonPatnam Act, reflected the new climate towards market processes. The Act's overall goal was clearly protectionist, namely, to defend small business -especially, small shops -from the competition of Yet, the majority of the economics profession did not share those anti-competition, pro-planning beliefs. Their reaction materialized in 1932, when the American Economic Review published a statement signed by 127 economists, under the leadership of Frank Fetter. The statement turned the associationalist argument on its head and claimed that, far from promoting a more rapid economic recovery, cartels, trade associations and unabashed market power were among the culprit for the persistence of economic crisis: 15 In particular, the Act reinforced the anti-price discrimination provision of §2 of the Clayton Act by limiting a firm's possibility to justify price rebates as quantity discounts.
<<…the most competent economic opinion […] can be cited in support of the view that a strong contributing cause of the unparalleled severity of the present depression was the greatly increased extent of monopolistic control of commodity prices.>> (Fetter et al. 1932, 467) .
It ensued an explicit appreciation for any policy measure aimed at the restoration of competitive market conditions, first and foremost antitrust law. Thus, it may well be argued that the US economists' attitude towards the Sherman Act became much more sympathetic precisely as a reaction against all those initiatives (like the Swope plan or the NIRA) which threatened to undermine the traditional, free-market structure of American economy. That the associationalist threat was indeed felt as really serious is also demonstrated by the circumstance that even one of the champions of the old Chicago school, Henry C. Simons, did not refrain from calling the policymaker to intervene in the market in order to preserve competitive conditions:
<<The representation of laissez faire as merely do-nothing policy is unfortunate and misleading. It is an obvious responsibility of the state under this policy to maintain the kind of legal and institutional framework within which competition can function effectively as an agency of control.>> (Simons 1948 (Simons [1934 , 42).
Crucially, he believed that the main measure to warrant this outcome had to be an active control over both business size and industry structure. 16 Simons's emphasis on structural features bears witness to the strength of the reaction in defense of competition and shows that the pendulum of antitrust enforcement was about to swing in a different -and tougher -direction with respect to J.B.
Clark's conduct-based approach.
In 1935, the Supreme Court canceled the NIRA. This event marked a dramatic shift in Roosevelt administration's approach to economic matters (so-called Second New Deal). The old agenda of structural interventions and planning was replaced by one based on macroeconomic policy. At the same time, competition was rehabilitated as the key process capable of restoring economic prosperity. The latter idea was epitomized by the appointment in 1938 of Thurman Arnold as head of the Department of Justice antitrust division, with the clear mandate to pursue an aggressive antitrust policy (Mayhew 1998, 197) . The swing was capped by the Supreme Court's effective revitalization of the Sherman Act via the introduction of new per se prohibitions in rulings such as
Interstate Circuit (1939) and Socony Vacuum (1940) . In short, starting from the mid-1930s a favorable combination of events led to the resurgence of antitrust in the US, thereby opening an era of aggressive contrast against monopolization and restraints of trade that was to last until the 1970s. 16 See e.g. Simons 1948 Simons [1934 , 59; 1936, 70-71. On Simons's antitrust views, see de Long 1990. given by the various dissolution proposals, like the Hart Bill, that were advanced with the goal of breaking up those industrial giants that had until then eluded antitrust law. Among the supporters of these deconcentration measures, together with the likes of Carl Kaysen and Donald Turner, 18 featured no less than George Stigler (Stigler 1952) , a sign of how SCP had conquered the hearts of even the staunchest Chicago free-marketeers! 17 Mason 1939 is traditionally considered the manifesto of the SCP approach. 18 Authors of the leading antitrust textbook of the time (Kaysen & Turner 1959) and keen supporters of dissolution proposals.
As it had already happened in the 1930s, the antitrust pendulum had swung too much. The time was ripe for its coming back to a more balanced position. The reaction against the excesses of structuralism came -so the standard story goes -once again from the economists' community, or, better, from one of its most influential sub-groups, the Chicago school. The Chicago counterrevolution in antitrust was founded on four pillars. First of all, a theoretical pillar, the socalled tight prior equilibrium, or "good approximation", hypothesis (Reder 1982) , that is to say, the idea that any economic system exhibits a spontaneous tendency to reach a situation of Paretooptimal equilibrium provided it is not disturbed by exogenous interferences, like those by government, antitrust authorities or courts (Reder 1982) . Secondly, an empirical pillar. According to Chicago economists, the data and observations used to found and validate the SCP approach were simply wrong: for example, the structuralist claim that the causation went from the number of firms in a market to the amount of profits each firm could earn had actually to be reversed since only the most efficient, i.e., most profitable, firms were those capable of surviving competition. The third pillar had to do with the viewpoint from which to evaluate competition and explain business conduct. Given that Pareto-optimality was the "natural" situation of markets (see first pillar), efficiency explanations of business behavior had to be privileged with respect to market power ones. Two corollaries followed. First, the focus of antitrust analysis should be on market performance, as well as on the conduct determining it, while the structuralist viewpoint had to be abandoned. Second, the measure of market performance had to be consumer welfare (<<…the only legitimate goal of antitrust…>> in the words of Bork 1978, 7), though it is easy to show that what Chicagoans really had in mind was not consumer welfare but total welfare, inclusive, that is to say, of producer surplus. 19 The fourth and final pillar was pragmatic (one might say, rhetoric), but perhaps even more important than the previous three. I refer to the special ability of Chicago scholars to translate their economic arguments into operational principles that courts and lawyers might easily understand and apply.
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The combination of the four pillars proved irresistible. At the end of the 1980s Chicago economists could be satisfied with their achievement: several business conducts had been declared per se legal, while a case-by-case evaluation was warranted for almost all the remaining types of behavior. Once again, a revolution in economic thought had caused a major swing in antitrust law. But: was it really a revolution, in the first place? Indeed, the extent of Chicago success in the field of antitrust is puzzling if we only consider that Chicago views have never achieved the same success in economics. It is fair to say, in fact, that economists in general, and industrial economists in particular, have never accepted Chicago tight prior equilibrium method and its implication, the static, non-strategic approach to competition. Chicago economists may have been able to "sell" the idea to legal scholars, but the truth remains that, contrary to their claims, their approach has never constituted "Economic Theory", but only a highly peculiar version of the neoclassical theory of perfectly competitive markets, of hardly any utility for the analysis of imperfect competition. 22 Since the mid-1980s, the advent and quick rise to dominance in industrial economics of game-theoretic methods has further clarified the situation in the marketplace of ideas, so much so that it is now customary to speak of a post-Chicago approach. However, the fact remains that for the last three decades legal scholars have considered Chicago views as representative of the whole economists' community -and they still do, as is testified by the several US courts which continue to endorse a static, non-strategic view of markets. 23 How to explain this?
A possible answer -which is clearly linked to the fourth pillar -is that Chicago has been first and foremost a school of antitrust analysis, rather than of industrial economics. Thus, while it is indisputable that game-theoretic arguments have showed that, Chicago claims notwithstanding, several SCP-style antitrust prescriptions do make good economic sense 24 because the behavior underlying them may well be explained in market-power, rather than efficiency, terms, 25 it is also true that game theory outcomes often lack the general predictive power that is required to support legal decisions, thereby making almost inevitable the recourse to a case-by-case, rule of reason analysis. Note that this is a kind of answer that still looks at the characters of the various economic methods and approaches in order to explain a phenomenon -the enduring popularity of Chicago economics -going on only in legal quarters. An alternative answer is what we suggest in the next section, namely, that the endorsement by US courts and legal scholars of Chicago economic theory has been just instrumental to the prevalence, and consolidation, of one of the two contrasting views of antitrust that have been facing each other since 1890 within the American legal community.
Remarkably, the very same answer may also help explain the other periods, and the swings between them, of US antitrust history.
The goal of the present section has been to sketch the economists' canonical narrative of American antitrust law and policy. This story bears strong support to the opinion which considers economic ideas -some would say, ideology 26 -the main engine behind antitrust steady evolution and occasional U-turns. Those sharing a more Whiggish inclination in historical reconstructions might even ignore all the ebbs and flows of the almost twelve decades of US antitrust and draw the general conclusion that such a history offers a perfect, handbook example of an economics-driven progress from darkness to light, from ignorance to science. 27 However, a different narrative is possible, one that places more emphasis on strictly legal arguments (and their ideological underpinnings, too) and on the temporary prevalence of one or the other of the two general -i.e., not strictly economic -meanings of the word "competition".
§2. A counter-history of US antitrust
The principle of competition, affirmed by the Supreme Court in Northern Securities (1904) , states that free competition is the most desirable mechanism for resource allocation. The principle has been the leading light for the next 100 years of US antritrust. Yet, we can follow Peritz (1990, 264) and ask what is "free competition". More specifically, "free" from what? Two answers are possible:
either that competition should be set free from government power or that it should be freed from 26 Cf. Martin 2007, 45-46; Page 2007. 27 Somehow more extremely, it has even been claimed that much of recent industrial economics is demand-driven -the demand being that of the parties involved in antitrust litigations for theories supporting the favored court outcomes (Kovacic 1992, 296 Let's go back to the dichotomy between two kinds of freedom: freedom from government power and freedom from market power. It is customary to read the principle of competition as synonymous of the latter. The underlying logical structure is that of the market as ideally atomistic and anonymous, were it not for the presence of agglomerates of power, i.e., monopolies and oligopolies. In Page's terms, this corresponds to the intentional vision of the market. It follows that the normative impulse behind antitrust law must be towards the promotion and preservation of atomistic competition among powerless agents, that is to say, towards the implementation of equality in the marketplace. Alternatively, it is possible to read the principle of competition as freedom from government power. This requires that we modify both the logical structure and the normative impulse. In the new logical structure the market is characterized by the agents' freedom to contract and to exploit their property rights. Such a freedom would be complete were it not for government interferences. This is what Page calls the evolutionary vision of the market. It follows that the normative impulse behind antitrust law must be towards the promotion and preservation of individual property rights, that is to say, towards the implementation of individual liberty in the marketplace. The traditional narrative of US antitrust history has conflated the principle of competition with freedom from market power. Peritz argues instead that such a history may be more satisfactorily described in terms of a permanent tension between the two logical catchwords of power and contract, or, equivalently, between the two normative goals of atomistic competition and property rights, or, as he prefers to say, between the two rhetorics of equality and liberty (Peritz 1990, 265) .
The tension between an intentional competition policy and an evolutionary defense of property rights is indeed perennial in US antitrust history. Each of the different phases into which such a history is usually divided (see above, §1) may in fact be explained -especially as far as the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is concerned -in terms of this tension, of the ensuing disagreement over the goals and the limits of antitrust law, and of the temporary prevalence of one vision or the other. And while there seemingly is no real conflict between the two normative goals -the defense of property rights being the obvious necessary condition for the existence of competitive marketsit is quite easy to show that such a conflict did, and does, exist.
Consider for instance the theme of "fair profit". Looking at the Congressional debate on the Sherman Act (1888-1890), Peritz shows that the idea that competition might eventually destroy a very specific individual right, namely, the common-law-based "right to earn a profit" from one's own business, was a winning argument that led to the eventual correction of the Act's actual wording -in particular, to the otherwise inexplicable elimination of Senator Sherman's original reference to "full and free competition" (see above, fn.11). Almost 90 years later, the same tension would arise in the Supreme Court's assessment of GTE Sylvania. Rather than representing the triumph of Chicago-style efficiency economics, the anti-free-riding rationale of such a landmark ruling descended from the Court's acknowledgment of the retailer's "right to earn a profit" from its promotional activity and after-sale services, and, consequently, of the legitimacy of the manufacturer's efforts to protect such a right via the imposition of vertical restraints aimed at avoiding its infringement by the retailer's free-riding rivals. More generally, Peritz remarks that the "fair profit" theme underlies much of the antitrust jurisprudence on merger cases. There the tension is between the willingness to avoid the creation of powerful market players and the need to respect an entrepreneur's right to earn a profit by selling her own business to the terms and conditions that she prefers.
Reading antitrust history through the lenses of Peritz's "competition versus property rights" dichotomy has momentous consequences. First, there is no need anymore to look almost exclusively at the evolution of neoclassical price theory, or at the various degrees of application of the welfare maximization logic, in order to explain the different phases of antitrust law and policy.
Second, we can reach a different perspective of those so-called "anti-competitive" impulses -such as the concern for scale economies or for distributional issues or for the survival of small businesswhich have always been present in antitrust debates, but which have also been almost invariably considered undeserving of real attention by antitrust historians on account of their being based on non-economic, that is to say, non-price theoretical, arguments. It turns out that several of those impulses have just been the outcome of the permanent tension between promoting competition and defending property rights.
Note that Peritz's dichotomy is not entirely alien to some of the best narratives of US antitrust history. Take e.g. Martin's 2005 survey. The author explicitly considers the possibility that the Sherman Act be just a codification of ordinary common law principles against contracts in restraint of trade (Martin 2007a, 20) ; then he quotes the late 1890s judicial opinion according to which courts could make exception to the general illegality of restraints of trade, but only for those agreements which, though restraining trade, should still be warranted enforcement because of their being ancillary to lawful contracts (ibid.); finally, he underlines that it was such a strictly legal, rather than economic, argument that eventually led the Supreme Court, first, to declare price fixing per se illegal (Addyston Pipe, 1899) and, then, a few years later, to prohibit resale price maintenance (Dr. Miles, 1911) , two rulings that basically still hold today (ibid., 22). Martin also recognizes that the idea that the freedom to contract (more exactly, the freedom from restraints on the right to contract) be the most efficient way to prevent monopolization provided the legal cornerstone for Standard Oil's rule of reason (ibid., 25). Furthermore, he remarks how Justice Holmes's famous dissenting opinion to the principle of competition in Northern Securities (1904) 30 was embodied a decade later in the Clayton Act's philosophy, namely, in the idea that antitrust law should eliminate any interference to the free play of market forces, but, absent any such interference, should leave to the market the selection of winners. Thus, while emphasizing J.B. Clark's role in the process leading to the Clayton Act, Martin also seems to recognize that the new Congressional approach to antitrust was founded on a legal, rather than economic, argument that turned upon the necessity to reconcile the two contrasting goals of protecting property rights and dissolving market power.
Among the modern cases proposed by Peritz as exemplary of the "competition versus property rights" dichotomy, one seems particularly noteworthy in view of what will be said in the following § § concerning EEC antitrust because of its close resemblance with Grundig, the very first big antitrust case dealt with by the European Court of Justice. In Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI, 1979) 31 the Supreme Court applied a property rights rhetoric to absolve the defendants of one of antitrust's gravest sins, i.e., price-fixing among competitors. The plaintiff CBS had argued that the bundling of copyrighted musical compositions into indivisible blocks (so-called blanket licenses) by BMI and ASCAP, the two dominant firms in the business of music licensing, constituted illegal price fixing.
Applying the rule of reason, rather than a per se logic, to a price-fixing case, the Court's majority referred to a classic antitrust case, Appalachian Coals (1933) , where the acquittal verdict had been motivated on the grounds that, in a situation of industry distress like that following the Depression, the preservation of the economic value of the defendants' business (i.e., the value of their property rights) deserved to prevail over the defense of free competition. In BMI the Court followed a similar reasoning and held that blanket licenses did not constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade because they enabled the copyright holders to enforce their property rights under the 1976 Copyright Act.
30 According to Holmes, common law required that a distinction be made between contracts in restraint of trade and combinations in restraint of trade -the former aiming at limiting the action of a party to the contract, the latter at keeping rivals out of business -and warranted protection to both whenever they were the outcome of the free exercise of the parties' property rights, while it imposed illegitimacy of both whenever they interfered with an outsider's ability to compete. See Martin 2007a, 23-24; Peritz 1996, 38-45. 31 Broadcast Music Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979). Here I follow Peritz 1996, 255-256.
Absent the license system, the rights would be subject to multiple use even without the owner's knowledge and this would clearly deprive her of the possibility to earn a remuneration from the use of her property.
The property rights logic also supported a second argument in favor of the blanket license system.
The Court characterized the repertoire of music created by the blanket license as an entirely different product, of which the individual compositions were just the inputs. This gave rise to a brand new property right independent of, and additional to, the statutory copyright entitlements.
Hence, no restraint among competing composers originated from the license agreement in the first place, since the bundled music was new property owned by a new owner, the licensing agencies BMI and ASCAP.
The tension between these arguments and the traditional competition rhetoric is testified by Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion. Stevens claimed that the blanket license created neither a new product nor new owners, as it was nothing but the tying together of old products augmented by an agreement illegally restraining competition among the products' individual owners. Yet, even the dissenter agreed that this form of price fixing should not be treated as per se illegal and deserved a rule of reason scrutiny. Hence, the whole Court believed that in such a case only the rule of reason might warrant the required balancing of the two opposing commitments to competition and property rights. Of course, Stevens insisted that competition law required that the Court strictly limit the value of copyrights to nothing more than the statutory monopoly privileges, i.e., what the individual holder might obtain under the Copyright Act. The bottom line of this reasoning was that the statutory entitlement of copyright holders need be viewed as embedded into the larger context of competition policy. The holders' freedom to contract could therefore be limited in view of the superior benefits of avoiding anti-competitive agreements. This was exactly the case with blanket licenses which, according to Stevens, produced so large a negative effect, in terms of higher prices and harms to non-participating composers, that it far exceeded the value of the statutory privileges granted to copyright owners.
Two lessons may be drawn from BMI. First, both opinions turned on the allocation and extent of property rights, rather than on some more or less refined price-theoretical model. This is a feature that is usually neglected in economists' analysis of antitrust cases, and even more so in historical reconstructions. Second, no clear cut conclusion may be drawn by merely looking at the allocation and extent of property rights since both answers, the Court's majority and Stevens's dissent, were plausible and convincing. Hence, a second element must be called into play and this cannot be other than an "ideological" feature, that is to say, each Justice's inclination towards one or the other of the While there is a consensus among historians that such a reconstruction faithfully describes the evolution of European competition law in the first half of the 20 th -century, a key, though very simple, question remains unanswered. Given that European countries followed an abuse-based approach to competition, how could it happen that in their first institutional experience of economic integration, namely, the European Community for Steel and Carbon (ECSC), the founding countries adopted a prohibition-based antitrust law? As is well known, the ECSC, established with the 1951
Treaty of Paris, has been the forerunner of the European Community, which was born just six years later. The previous question gains therefore even more importance on account of the fact that the ECSC rules on competition have been the blueprint for the antitrust articles of the 1957 Treaty of Rome, that is to say, for the very rules that for the last half century have been governing European competition policy at both the Community and, since the mid-1980s, the national level.
There is indeed a standard answer also to this question. It might well be dubbed "the Americanization of European antitrust". According to it, the prohibition approach to competition first entered Europe with the 1947 law imposed by the US Military Government to achieve the decartelization and deconcentration of German industry. The law reflected the tradition of
American antitrust, at least as far as the prohibition of cartels, trusts and restrictive practices was concerned. The new approach gained further strength with the beginning of the Cold War, as the US government changed its plans about the future of the German economy. In view of the Communist challenge, Germany's industrial structure had to be preserved as much as possible. Yet, at the same time, an institutional framework had to be created to ensure that Germany itself would never again threaten its Western European neighbors. The solution to reconcile these two conflicting goals was found in exporting to Europe in general, and to Germany in particular, the American economic model. This was a model that, under the general belief in the superiority of the free market system, was concretely based on an oligopolistic, rather perfectly competitive, market structure, with firms large enough to exploit the gains of size and technological efficiency but, at the same time, unable to undertake anti-competitive conducts due to the aggressive enforcement of strong antitrust rules.
The combination "oligopoly plus strong antitrust" -which effectively captures the reality of US postwar economy as shaped by business history, on the one side, and the SCP-style Supreme Court interpretation of competition law (see above, §1), on the other -was the explicit benchmark for the German economy set by the US Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS).
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The canonical narrative goes on describing the two fights that the US government had to win to impose this benchmark first in Germany and then in Europe. Thus, it seems legitimate to conclude that with the Treaty of Paris a brand new antitrust tradition, based on the prohibition, rather than the abuse, approach, entered Europe. That it was the outcome of a political, much more than economic, logic, or that it aimed at a peculiar mix of "oligopoly plus strong antitrust", rather than at the neoclassical ideal of perfect competition, should not conceal the fact that this new tradition, and the EEC antitrust rules which were soon to originate from it, wore
Stars & Stripes on their sleeves.
Against this canonical narrative, David Gerber has proposed an alternative story, which places much more emphasis on Europe's interwar tradition of antitrust policy, while at the same time 38 For those of a conspiration-theory penchant, it may be worthwhile to add that Robert Bowie was later to become a prominent member of the Trilateral Commission, as well as the CIA Deputy Director for National Intelligence (see www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/globalpartnerships/missiledefense/Bowie.htm). 39 Note however that other articles dealt more or less directly with competition issues, such as Article 60 which forbade unfair practices, like predatory or discriminatory pricing. 40 For the details of the negotiations leading to the approval of Article 66, including the replacement of an earlier draft, which included a stricter, per se prohibition rule, with the final, softer, version, see Witschke 2001, 7-18. 41 Bowie had dealt with merger issues since in Law School. His 3 rd year paper at Harvard was on "Section 7 of the Clayton Act". See lms01.harvard.edu/F/SL37GHS5FL6688UCX6VKCG6F73MSGEAA7TR9U27BGKXTBL83EE-53925?func=full-set-set&set_number=228811&set_entry=000002&format=999
The latter feature proved crucial for the propagation of Freiburg ideas in post-WWII Germany. The first and foremost of these ideas was the belief that private economic power had been the main cause of Germany's economic and political disintegration during the interwar years. Hence, from the very beginning the ordoliberals' goal was to revive German people's faith in the market mechanism by turning it from a despised source of social division and inequality into a necessary tool for social integration. Necessary but, as already said, not sufficient. Social integration could 47 The rest of the section follows Gerber 1998, Ch.7. 48 Note that the term "Ordoliberalism" is typically applied to a broader set of ideas than those of the Freiburg School. For instance, authors like Wilhelm Röpke are usually considered ordoliberals, though they lacked direct connections with Freiburg. An even broader notion is that of "social market economy", a term coined in 1946 by Alfred Müller-Armack (see Goldschmidt 2004) . Social market economy supporters -of whom Ludwig Erhard was the most famousagreed on most points of ordoliberal economic policies, but placed greater emphasis on equity goals. Vanberg (2004, 2) argues that social market economy was outcome-oriented, while ordoliberalism was strictly procedural and ruleoriented. As a consequence, while ordoliberals believed that market order had an ethical value per se -namely, that of being a privilege-free order -the supporters of the social market economy viewed the market as simply the most efficient wealth-producing instrument, devoid of any inherent ethical quality. To turn the market into an ethical order, some supplementary policies were needed, in particular, social policies. The latter need not be constrained by market order rules. Here, according to Vanberg, lay an important difference with respect to ordoliberals who stressed that no social provision should ever contradict the privilege-free nature of the market order. 49 The three wrote the manifesto of Ordoliberalism in 1936: see Böhm, Eucken & Grossmann-Doerth 1989 [1936 . 50 On this aspect of Ordoliberalism, see Rieter & Schmolz 1993. only be achieved by embedding the economy into a well-defined legal framework. At the center of such a framework was competition law.
More in detail, Freiburg scholars envisioned a society where democratic institutions warranted that individuals be free from both government and private power. The latter could be either political or economic. Hence, the necessity that freedom from government and political interference be complemented by freedom from private economic power. In other words, competition was deemed necessary for social well-being as much as democracy itself. While all this was well inside the classical liberal tradition, a first original element of Ordoliberalism came from the idea that a strong state be required in order to protect individuals from private economic power. By this expression ordoliberals meant neither an authoritarian nor a discretionary state, but rather a state which could resist the pressure of private power and interests. To foster such a resistance, governments' discretionality had to be constrained by a properly designed legal framework, or constitution, capable of preventing all kinds of rent-seeking activity (Vanberg 2004, 17) . But even more necessary was the dispersion of private economic power in the first place. The instrument to do that was competition. As Böhm put it in 1960, <<…competition is by no means only an incentive mechanism but, first of all, an instrument for the deprivation of power […] the most magnificent and most ingenious instrument of deprivation of power in history.>>. 51 Yet, competition could only fulfill its promise within a legal framework created and maintained to protect its correct functioning. The economic and the legal sides were therefore necessarily interrelated in a properly working, prosperous society. This was the basic intuition behind the ordoliberals' call for the integration of legal and economic knowledge: law determined the rules of the economic game, so much so that it was simply impossible to understand economic processes without a comprehension of legal rules.
Eucken's specific methodological innovation was the so-called "thinking in orders" (Denken in Ordnungen), that is to say, the idea that beneath the complexity and heterogeneity of the various economic systems some fundamental patterns -or orders -could be identified (Eucken 1992 (Eucken [1939 ). He claimed that recognizing these patterns was the only way to penetrate this complexity and understand the dynamics of economic phenomena. The two fundamental orders were, as Eucken called them, the "transaction economy" and the "centrally administered economy" (ibid.).
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In the former, economic activity was driven by the free and independent decisions of private agents, each guided by her own incentives. In the latter, it was up to the government to organize and direct 51 Quoted by Vanberg 2004, 12. In terms of Page's distinction (see above, §2) ordoliberals clearly embraced an intentional vision of the market. 52 Little surprise at that: those were the years of market socialism debates and Eucken himself had close personal and intellectual ties with Friedrich von Hayek.
economic activity. The Freiburg School unanimously believed that, at least in the case of Germany, the transaction order was the best one for achieving economic prosperity.
A key principle of Eucken's "thinking in orders" was that all the elements constitutive of an order were mutually consistent and actually reinforced each other. It followed that "pure" economic orders could achieve a superior performance than real economic systems which were always "impure" due to the inevitable mixing of components from both orders. From this the ordoliberals draw the desirability of making no compromise in the construction of a transaction economy, in particular as far as the proper functioning of competitive markets was concerned. Indeed, competition turned out to be the essential element of the transaction order: Freiburg scholars took it as an axiom that competition be the main engine of economic prosperity and that its intensity be directly correlated to systemic performance. Eucken actually used the term "complete competition", meaning competition without coercive power 53 -the kind of competition that exists when no agent in the marketplace has the possibility to force, or constrain, the behavior of any other agent.
Another original element of ordoliberalism was the constitutional dimension of economic issues.
This was added in order to achieve the required integration between the legal and the economic side of the analysis. Freiburg scholars claimed that a society's constitution had also to establish the characteristics of its economic order. In the definition of the ordoliberal manifesto, the economic constitution is <<…a general political decision as to how the economic life of the nation is to be structured.>> (Böhm, Eucken & Grossmann-Doerth 1989, 24) . The main idea was that <<[e]conomic systems did not just "happen"; they were "formed" through political and legal decision-making. These fundamental choices determined a nation's economic constitution.>> (Gerber 1998, 245) . 54 Yet, the economic constitution could not suffice to warrant the achievement of the desired economic order. Constitutional choices had in fact to be made effective by a legal system and government policies specifically designed to implement them. In other words, the principles enshrined in the economic constitution should represent at the same time the source and the constraint for the specific decisions made by governments and legislators. Gerber (1998, 246) , this view amounted to turning classical liberalism on its head: rather than requiring the economy to be independent of the legal and political system, ordoliberals argued that both the characteristics and the performance of an economy depended on such a system.
In particular, whenever the economic constitution devised a transaction economy, order-based policies should be such as to configure a legal system capable of creating and maintaining "complete competition", i.e., the necessary condition for the most effective functioning of such an order. From a practical viewpoint, these policies could be implemented only after the economists' description of the essential features of "complete competition" had been translated into normative guidelines for legislators and policy-makers. Bridging the information gap between economic theory and actual law-and policy-making was precisely the task ordoliberals had assigned themselves.
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As to the objection that they seemingly tributed too large a role to government intervention, with the risk of generating an excessively regulated an economy, ordoliberals replied that the economic constitution warranted that policy-makers decisions about the legal environment of the market be rigidly constrained. The essence of Ordnungspolitik was precisely that constitutionally-bounded laws should provide the basic principles of economic conduct, while governments should act just to enforce these principles, with no room left for discretional choices. In other words, Ordnungspolitik amounted to answering time and again the question: "is this law or government action in conformity to the economic constitution?". This shows that ordoliberals had found an original way out from the classical liberal dilemma of calling for government action to defend competition, on the one side, and recognizing that government itself may interfere with market processes, on the other. The constitutional dimension of their analysis, paired with the notion of Ordnungspolitik, allowed them to reconcile the requirement for the legal foundation and defense of the market economy with the refusal of government discretionary interventions.
A different way to appreciate the ordoliberal notion of Ordnungspolitik -or "indirect regulation", as they also called it -is by referring to Eucken's distinction between constitutive principles and regulative principles. The former were the fundamental principles establishing an economy's order and upon which indirect regulation had to be based: in a transaction economy, these were the principles of, say, private property, contractual freedom, open markets or monetary stability.
Regulative principles flowed from constitutive ones and were bound by them. They were more specific and their main goal was to support indirect regulation and warrant the effectiveness of From what we have said about the transaction order, it is hardly surprising that the keystone of the ordoliberal program was competition law. History had taught ordoliberals that economic freedom tended to be self-destructive: competition collapsed, first, because firms always preferred private, i.e., contractual, regulation of business to market, i.e., competitive, regulation, and, second, because firms were frequently able to gain so much economic power that they could just get rid of competition. In both cases, the core problem was private economic power; as we said before, the primary goal of competition law had to be the elimination of such power or, at least, the prevention of its harmful effects.
A broad conception of economic power and the idea of employing it as the primary structuring device of competition rules is one of the features of German and EEC antitrust law that most clearly distinguish it from its US analogue. 56 It is therefore essential to understand that the root of the distinction may be found in the Freiburg School. Indeed, Eucken's "complete competition" (i.e., absence-of-coercion) standard demanded that competition law be used to prevent the creation of monopolistic power and to wipe out existing monopolistic power whenever possible, or, when impossible, to control the way monopolies used their power. Yet, it is important to remark that the no-coercion standard led ordoliberals to propose a kind of competition law closer to the American tradition than to the usual European approach. Freiburg scholars, in fact, rejected the administrative (that is, discretionary) controls on competition abuses which had been popular in various European countries since the late 1920s and embraced in their stead a prohibition approach. Hence, by following an independent and highly original intellectual trajectory, ordoliberals came to formulate an antitrust law whose provisions -though not its enforcement setup: see below -closely resembled those of US law. This explains why, as detailed in the previous §, several historians have just conflated the two and concluded that postwar Europe simply "imported" American competition rules.
Specifically, ordoliberals believed that the legal prohibition of monopoly had to be primarily directed against cartels and all other kinds of power-creating agreements between competitors.
More controversial was the attitude that competition law should adopt with respect to other, nonagreement-based forms of monopoly, such as natural monopoly, legal monopoly or monopoly achieved on the merits. Some ordoliberals, Böhm among them, supported a very aggressive approach: whenever market power existed, it had to be eliminated by any means, including forced 56 Referring again to Page's terminology, the intentional vision supporting antitrust law, though always influential, is more transparent in the German and EEC case than in the American one.
divestures. Others preferred a gentler approach to non-agreement-based monopolies, one where law was called to prescribe a standard of conduct. One such standard was formulated in 1937 by Leonhard Miksch, who argued that economically powerful firms should be required to behave as if they were subject to competition, i.e., as if they had no such power. 57 By limiting a firm's behavior to conduct consistent with "complete competition", Miksch's "as if standard" provided an objectively applicable measure for the control of monopolies. 58 The standard was in turn founded on a distinction already existing in German jurisprudence, namely, that between performance competition, i.e., conduct directed at achieving quality improvements or lower prices for a firm's products, and impediment competition, i.e., conduct designed to hinder a rival's capacity to perform.
The goal of the "as if standard" was to forbid the latter and allow the former, regardless of the specific market structure. Hence, it clearly embodied a conduct-based view of antitrust, quite distant from the structural approach so popular in postwar US competition law. Again, the fact that the very same distinction between performance and impediment competition would provide one of the intellectual pillars of modern German antitrust is a tribute to the Freiburg influence, as well as a good reminder of the limits of the simplistic narrative based on the sheer borrowing of the American antitrust tradition.
Finally, Freiburg scholars also devised a new institutional framework for the application and enforcement of competition law. Generally speaking, Ordnungspolitik required that the constitutional model of "complete competition" dictate the general antitrust principles, that these principles be turned into enforceable law and that an independent office be in charge of applying and policing them. More specifically, ordoliberals envisioned a system where:
-The legislative power should enact a competition law based on the economic constitution of a transaction order. This just required translating into legal terms the constitutive principles embodied in the "complete competition" model. It followed that legislators had little discretion in writing the law.
-An independent monopoly office should be responsible of enforcing competition law. The office should enjoy complete autonomy from the executive power and its status should be quasi-judicial.
Since the office should apply legal norms according to objective standards, again little if any room remained for discretionary behavior.
-The judiciary should review the decisions of the monopoly office for their conformity to competition law and the economic constitution. Given the limited discretionary power of the monopoly office, the reviewing task should pertain to regular courts, rather than administrative tribunals.
Before moving on to assess the extent of ordoliberal influence on EEC antitrust law, a few words must be added on Freiburg success in homeland Germany. Even without questioning the validity of the canonical narrative, the previous paragraphs show that ordoliberals had the right plan to reconcile the two seemingly conflicting goals of the US military administration in postwar Germany, namely, the dismantlement of industrial cartels and the promotion of market-driven economic development. If the US really sought to use Germany as a kind of laboratory to prove the superiority of the free market system, ordoliberals methods, values and ideas were perfectly suited for such a task. Moreover, it turned out that Freiburg scholars were among the few qualified
Germans who had no ties with the Nazi regime. Thus, it is hardly surprising that ordoliberals occupied key posts in government or as advisors. Indeed, more than 50% of the members of the Academic Advisory Council formed in 1947 to support government policy were ordoliberals (Gerber 1998, 257) . Miksch himself joined the "office for the administration of the economy", the predecessor of today's German Ministry for Economic Affairs, where he authored the so-called "Guiding Principle Law" which was to play a key role in Germany's economic recovery. historically played a very marginal role, these countries tended to believe that the two Articles should be applied only in exceptional cases, involving very large firms.
The two fights went on for many years, but eventually ordoliberal-inspired Germans won both. In the end, none disputed anymore that EEC competition law deserved a juridical approach, nor that such a law should play a central role in the process of European integration. The key to the German success lay in the circumstance that the EEC first and fundamental goal was the achievement of an integrated market. Such a goal also affected the construction of the competition law system. Indeed, an integrated market had two closely related advantages. On the one side, it would allow European firms to gain sufficient size to fully exploit their scale economies and effectively compete on world markets. On the other, integration might also be viewed as furthering consumer welfare. This second point turned out to be crucial for competition law. The idea that more competition would lead to greater benefits for European consumers might in fact be reworded in integration jargon. capitals, might actually be seen as instrumental to enhancing competition via the increase in the number of actual and potential competitors in every European market. Hence, to the extent that competition law helped eliminate those obstacles, it directly and indirectly served both the cause of market integration and that of European consumers. The bottom line was that competition law should be viewed as an essential tool to promote the EEC Holy Grail, market integration.
Remarkably, this reasoning was already present in the 1956 Spaak Report, where price discrimination was singled out as an instance of a private barrier to trade which would not survive the tougher competition following market integration (Spaak 1956, 54) .
62
The piece of legislation that most clearly reveals Germany's success is the fundamental that is to say, with respect to the required regulative principles. The Dutch approach prescribed that all restrictive agreements be notified to the Commission as a necessary and sufficient condition for their presumptive validity; it should then be up to the Commission to prove that an agreement need be made void ex nunc because it abused competition. The French approach was even softer in that it left to firms to decide whether an agreement was legal, while the Commission maintained the power to challenge each agreement and, in case, make it retroactively void. Finally, the German approach stuck to Ordoliberalism and coherently called for a system based on preventive controls, a general prohibition rule and the granting of exemptions only to agreements which had, first, been notified to the Commission, and, then, explicitly declared by the Commission as deserving a " §3-exemption". 62 Recall that one of the authors of the Report was the German ordoliberal von der Groeben. Martin (2006, 137) correctly observes that the argument according to which the goals of integration and efficiency are mutually consistent should not be taken for granted outside the ideal case of perfectly competitive markets. If, despite integration, a market remains non-perfectly competitive (as it should if the source of market power is not in the geographical separation of markets), the possibility of, say, price discrimination would remain intact. Yet, it is also true that it is precisely in nonperfectly competitive markets that integration may bring the most significant improvement in performance by increasing the number of competitors, ejecting from market the least efficient firms and allowing the surviving firms to enjoy scale economies (Martin 2004, 10-11 Germany won this battle too. The outcome, i.e., Reg.17/62, canceled any remaining doubt that competition law be given full juridical status, and at the same time devised a very original institutional framework fully consistent with the ordoliberal design (Gerber 1998, 349-351) .
Antitrust enforcement was centralized in the hands of the Commission and away from those of national competition authorities. To this aim, the Competition Directorate was granted a high degree of autonomy, unparalleled by any other Commission directorate. Though the system relied heavily on the initiatives and decisions of the Commission, the latter's discretionary power was nonetheless rigidly constrained within the limits set by the economic constitution (i.e., the relevant Articles in the Treaty of Rome) and the regulative principles of Reg.17/62.
The other key body in the application of European competition law was the Court of Justice, whose main task was to review the Commission's decisions. As remarked by Gerber (1998, 351) , the Court has traditionally played a leadership role in the EEC integration process. Indeed, it did not take long for the Court to realize that competition law might be an important vehicle towards this goal. As a consequence, antitrust case law has been developed primarily as a tool to promote
European integration in the form of a Common Market. This is a very important aspect that need be kept in mind when analyzing the principles contained in the Court's antitrust rulings. As Gerber puts it, <<…the Court made teleology the cornerstone of its interpretive strategy […] the Court interpreted the treaty's competition law provisions according to its own conceptions of what was necessary to achieve the integrationist goals…>> (ibid., 353).
Thus, in contrast to national competition laws, whose primary objective is, or should be, the maximization of the economic benefits generated by a market economy, EEC competition law has been shaped by the Court according to a very different goal: the elimination of all kinds of private restraints to trade across national borders. Or, to put it differently, the Court has singled out integration as the main principle and objective of the EEC economic constitution, and thus has consistently privileged those interpretations of competition rules which are more conducive to the Common Market goal. The Court's behavior has also influenced the Commission's since cooperating with the Court and accepting its intellectual leadership with respect to the integration goal was in the EEC early years the only way a basically weak Commission could ensure that its own interpretations and applications of antitrust rules be granted authoritativeness.
In the first years of enforcement of EEC competition law, the centrality of the integration goal and The German producer of radios and televisions Grundig had stipulated in 1957 an exclusive distribution agreement with a French firm called Consten. As a Grundig representative, Consten was committed to bearing the costs of local advertising and to ensuring after-sales services;
moreover, it could neither sell products from Grundig competitors nor export Grundig products to other European countries. In return, Grundig agreed to sell its products in France only through this sole distributor, thereby granting Consten absolute territorial protection from the "parallel imports"
of Grundig products into France. Moreover, for the duration of the contract Consten was authorized to use the trademark "Grundig", though it could not register it in France. However, Consten registered in its own name the trademark "GINT" (for Grundig International), under the agreement with Grundig that it would cancel this registration or assign the GINT trademark to Grundig if and when Consten ceased to be Grundig's exclusive distributor in France.
Contracts with similar clauses -including the national registration of the GINT trademark -had been concluded by Grundig with distributors in the other EEC Member States. Yet, despite the existence of such a contract, several distributors began to deliver Grundig products outside the distribution zones they had been assigned. There is an additional lesson that Grundig may teach us, more directly pertaining to the "competition versus property rights" dichotomy. The Court in fact also approved the Commission's choice to take into account, and condemn, the assignment of the GINT trademark to Consten as an ancillary restriction reinforcing the exclusionary agreement. According to the Court, trademarks and other intellectual property rights should never be used to circumvent competition law, even when a Member State's domestic law might allow that. at least as far as the trademark clause was concerned. The forced cancellation of the clause would in fact be viewed as an arbitrary interference in the parties' freedom to contract and in the full enjoyment of Grundig's property rights over its own brand name. Yet, the Court's choice was to
give a narrow interpretation to Articles 36 and 222. In striking a balance between the opposing requirements of EEC competition law and of national property rights legislations, the needs of the Community were given priority. Faced with the tough question of how far should the owner of a property right be allowed to exercise it, and whether the right's extension should be such as to admit the possibility of exercising it as an obstruction to transborder trade, the Court ruled that the EEC Treaty did not allow the "improper" use of rights under any national trademark law, where "improper" should be taken to mean "such as to frustrate the Community's competition law". 68 In short, the Grundig ruling established the principle that it was the exercise of the right, not its existence, that might be abusive with respect to the Treaty's integration goal and that, if this was actually the case, it deserved no protection at all.
If we recall that in the BMI case the US Supreme Court had concluded that only a rule of reason assessment might warrant the required balance between the two opposing commitments to competition and property rights (see above, §2), the contrast with the Grundig case is apparent. In BMI there was no a priori reason to decide one way or the other: the defense of competition and that of property rights stood on equal footing and the Supreme Court simply had to carefully ponder the weights of the two arguments. On the contrary, an a priori criterion did exist constitutional standing of the Common Market principle constituted a decisive reference point for both the Commission and the Court of Justice, so much so that the pendulum between competition and property rights had necessarily to be shifted in the direction more conducive to the integration goal. Hence, comparing BMI and Grundig highlights a very big difference between the two antitrust traditions -one whose relevance may hardly be overestimated but which is usually neglected in the literature. 69 It is all the more remarkable that, according to the present reconstruction, such a difference should be attributed to the decisive role played in the building of EEC competition law and institutions by the Freiburg school of lawyers and economists.
Conclusion
The stated goal of competition policy -as declared in, say, the Commission's official brochure explaining to the general public the activity of the Competition Directorate (European Commission 2004) -is to avoid that harm be caused to consumers by those instances of business behavior capable of undermining the competitive process. Accordingly, one of the best contemporary handbooks defined competition policies as: <<…the sets of policies and laws which ensure that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce economic welfare.>> (Motta 2004, 30) . This paper, and more generally the research project of which the present work constitutes a first step, aims at demonstrating that, historically speaking, the equation "competition policy = protection of consumer welfare" is at best highly debatable both in Europe and the US.
First of all, the history of US antitrust law shows that several motives, other than the maximization of consumer welfare, may explain why competition deserves being protected.
Motives such as the defense of small business or the concentration of too much economic, and possibly political, power in the hands of few firms have been used to justify the introduction of antitrust provisions. Hence, it is simply false to claim that either the Sherman or the Clayton Act were approved in the supreme interest of the consumer.
Secondly, it is still the US experience that reveals the limits of an approach to antitrust history too narrowly focused on the evolution of economists' thoughts on competition. Indeed, whatever the reason for the legal protection of competition, this motivation has always been contrasted, especially in courts, by an opposite, and equally strong, impulse to defend property rights and the freedom to contract -what I called the "competition versus property rights" dichotomy. The ebbs and flows of twelve decades of American antitrust may thus be explained in terms of the temporary prevalence of one or the other of these impulses, rather than by the sequence of economic doctrines that have occasionally risen to dominance in the marketplace of ideas.
Third, and most important, the canonical narrative explaining the birth of EEC antitrust law only in terms of the postwar importation of the American tradition fails to take into due account two crucial features of the European experience of clear non-American origin, namely, the constitutional standing of competition and its rather peculiar goal. That competition and the necessity of its defense be enshrined in Europe's "economic constitution" reveals the influence of the Freiburg School of law and economics, the intellectual background of many key German representatives during the ECSC and EEC negotiations. By openly shifting the balance of the above-mentioned dichotomy towards the "competition" pole, this feature has provided European antitrust enforcers with clear behavioral directions to be followed in controversial cases. These directions have been reinforced by the second feature, namely, the idea that competition is instrumental to the achievement of the truly fundamental EEC goal, the Common Market. Though never mentioned in To sum up, EEC antitrust law and policy emerge as the outcome of the highly peculiar combination between the ordoliberal call for a constitutional foundation of economic policy-making and the integration goal. Such a combination clearly differentiates the EEC competition tradition from its American counterpart. Moreover, it shows that some economists did have a significant influence on the building of that tradition, although not, as it might be expected, via their everimproving modeling of imperfect competition, but rather via their devising a very original approach to the interconnection, and mutual dependence, of law and economics. In a nutshell, as far as Europe is concerned, it was neither Cambridge nor Columbia nor Chicago, but Freiburg plus (the Treaty of) Rome.
